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The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violatcd, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
In order to implement this protection, the Supreme Court adopted a
rule excluding from trial evidence obtained in violation of this con-
stitutional provision.' However, the Court has traditionally held that
a defendant who wishes to have evidence excluded must first establish
standing to object to the unlawful search.2
Several commentators have urged that standing be abolished on
the grounds that it is irrational and inconsistent with the avowed intent
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1 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). The Supreme Court applied the
exclusionary rule to the states through Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), and Ker
v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
2 See, e.g., Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968); Jones v. United States,
362 U.S. 257 (1960) ; FED. R. Caxm. P. 41(e).
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of the exclusionary rule.8 Despite their criticism and predictions of the
rule's demise, the Supreme Court recently affirmed the standing require-
ment in Alderman v. United States.4
Analysis of recent cases indicates that the law of standing is in
transition; new criteria are being employed to determine when a de-
fendant may exclude illegally obtained evidence which, if admitted at
trial, would be likely to convict him of a crime. This Article attempts
to delineate the present law of standing, to point out its inadequacies
and inconsistencies, and to suggest a rule which will better serve the
social considerations underlying the doctrine.
I. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Judge Cardozo's famous statement, "The criminal is to go free
because the constable has blundered," ' does not imply that whenever
the constable blunders, the evidence that he obtains must be excluded
from trial.6 The rule that relevant evidence seized in violation of the
fourth amendment may be excluded from a criminal trial was arrived at
"only on the nicest balance of competing considerations and in view of
the necessity of finding some effective judicial sanction to preserve the
Constitution's search and seizure guarantees." 7
Every time the exclusionary rule is applied there is a social cost
directly proportional to the relevance of the excluded evidence. This
social cost at some point must limit the scope of the rule. As Professor
Amsterdam has said:
[The exclusionary] rule is a needed, but grudingly taken,
medicament; no more should be swallowed than is needed
to combat the disease...
As the exclusionary rule is applied time after time, it
seems that its deterrent efficacy at some stage reaches a point
of diminishing returns, and beyond that point its continued
application is a public nuisance.'
3 See J. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT 73-77
(1966) ; Grove, Suppression of Illegally Obtained Evidence: The Standing Require-
inent on Its Last Leg, 18 CATHOLIC U. L. REv. 150 (1968) ; Comment, Standing to
Object to an Unreasonable Search and Seizure, 34 U. CiEL L. REv. 342 (1967) ; Note,
Search and Seizure: Admissibility of Illegally Acquired Evidence Against Third
Parties, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 400 (1966).
4394 U.S. 165 (1969).
5 People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926).
1 Compare Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969).
-tAmsterdam, Search, Seizure, and Section 2255: A Comment, 112 U. PA. L. REv.
378, 388 (1964).
8 Id. 389.
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Although it recognized the social cost involved, the Court adopted the
exclusionary rule to deter illegal police conductf However, in many
cases the cost to society of excluding relevant evidence outweighs the
deterrent effect on police conduct. When this occurs, there is no reason
to allow a defendant to object to the introduction of the evidence. In
Alderman v. United States,'" the Court recognized that the standing
doctrine is a method of preventing the exclusionary rule from operating
beyond the point of "diminishing returns." "
Ascertaining the precise point of optimal deterrence is a difficult
process. Two primary questions must be answered-what effect, if any,
does the exclusionary rule have on police conduct,"2 and how much is a
given amount of deterrence worth to society?
More information about police motivation is needed to answer the
first question with precision. If police felt bound to follow the law in
all situations, the exclusionary rule would have no deterrent effect, since
the police would already be striving to make only reasonable, authorized
searches. On the other hand, if police decide to seize evidence solely
on the basis of the likelihood of its admissibility at trial, the rule would
have a maximum effect.
Yet neither of these behavioral models adequately explains police
conduct, for
norms located within police organization are more powerful
than court decisions in shaping police behavior, and actually
the process of interaction between the two accounts ultimately
for how police behave.' 3
9 See Mvfapp v. Ohio. 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961) ; Elkins v. United States. 364 U.S.
206, 217 (1960); Barrett, Exclusion of Evidence Obtained by Illegal Searches-A
Comment on People vs. Cahan, 43 CALIF. L. REv. 565, 579-83 (1955).
Another rationale for the rule is that it is a violation of a defendant's right against
self-incrimination to use against him evidence seized in violation of the Constitution.
See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 661-66 (1961) (Black, J., concurring). This rationale
is criticized in Bender, The Retroactive Effect of an Overruling Constitutional Deci-
sion: Mapp v. Ohio, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 650, 664-68 (1962).
An earlier rationale for the rule was keeping tainted material out of the courts.
See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dis-
senting) ; id. at 469-70 (Holmes, J., dissenting). This rationale is criticized in Barrett,
supra at 582.
10 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
1i Id. at 175. Another method utilized to accomplish this end is to admit evidence
although it stems from an unlawful search if it is purged of the "primary taint
of the unlawful invasion." Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 486 (1963).
See generally Pitler, "The Fruit of the Poisonous Tree" Revisited and Shepardized,
56 CA IF. L. REv. 579 (1968); Maguire, How to Unpoison the Fruit-The Fourth
Amendment and the Exclusionary Rule, 55 J. Cam. L.C. & P. S. 307 (1964). A
third method used to accomplish the same purpose is to deny relief on collateral attack
in search and seizure cases. Text accompanying notes 19-26 infra.
12 Compare Paulsen, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Third Degree, 6 STAN.
L. REv. 411, 435 (1954):
Whether rules which prevent the prosecution from using evidence in court
effectively deter police lawlessness is one of the most enduring controversies
about law. The controversy is fed by many opinions and few facts.
13 J. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TIAL 219 (1966).
19701
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In order better to understand police conduct it is important to recognize
the goals of the police organization. Most important among the various
goals is the compilation of an impressive record of arrests, for this is
one measure of a patrolman.' 4 With pressure on him to meet his arrest
quota, a policeman will often make an illegal search to gather evidence
on which to base an arrest, although he is aware that the evidence will
be inadmissible at trial.15
A second goal of the police is to prevent crime; many searches
are made for purely preventive reasons, rather than to garner evidence
for eventual prosecution.'6 Since prosecution is not contemplated, it is
extremely doubtful whether the exclusionary rule can have any deterrent
effect in these cases. Thus, it is primarily in those cases where prosecu-
tion is contemplated that the exclusionary rule plays a significant role.
Even where the police strive to follow the correct procedures in
making a search, it may still be illegal because of the inability of a police-
man to understand the rules of search and seizure.' 7  Often the police
make an improper search where they were actually in possession of
sufficient facts to authorize a legal one.'" Obviously, the exclusionary
rule will have more deterrent value in cases where the police intentionally
make an unreasonable search than in those cases where the impropriety
is due to negligence or ignorance. When negligence or ignorance is
involved, the rule can, at best, make a policeman act with greater care,
or perhaps encourage him to seek the advice of more learned men.
While the exclusionary rule will deter some improper police con-
duct, due to the many variables involved its precise effect is not ascer-
tainable. Even if we could more accurately measure its deterrent value,
we would still want to know exactly what price (measured in acquitted,
but guilty defendants) society is willing to pay for a given amount of
deterrence. The exclusionary rule itself is an indication that upon
balancing the relative interests, the Court, at least, concludes that
society places a higher value in most cases on deterring unreasonable
searches than it does on convicting as many criminals as possible. The
standing requirement, however, evidences that this is not an absolute,
and that in some cases deterrence must give way to society's interests in
punishing wrongdoers.
Whether one applies the exclusionary rule broadly or tempers it
with the standing requirement depends on the relative value placed on
a given amount of deterrence. It depends, for example, on whether
14 See A. NIEERzHomm, BEHIND THE SHIELiD 53 (1967).
15 See J. SKoLNxicK, mtpra note 13, at 220.
'16Id. 144-45.
17Id. 214.
is See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Rowe, 433 Pa. 14, 249 A.2d 911 (1969).
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one prefers to free one criminal if the probable effect of the action is
to deter ten improper searches, and whether one is prepared to free
ten criminals on the chance that one improper search might be deterred.
Among the factors relevant to making these choices are the number
of policemen who make unlawful searches and the total number of illegal
searches made. It may also be relevant to consider the type of improper
search that commonly occurs. One might be more willing to extend
the exclusionary rule if the effect were to deter warrantless searches
of homes, than if the primary effect were to deter unreasonable searches
of garages.
Although the Court is aware of society's conflicting desires both to
punish wrongdoers and to deter illegal police conduct, it often decides
cases without adequately considering the conflict. For instance, in
Kaufman v. United States,' the Court held that a convicted defendant
who failed to raise a search and seizure claim in a federal criminal trial
may raise this claim in a federal post-conviction proceeding."0 The
Court explicitly rejected the prosecution's argument that the minimal
additional deterrence gained by allowing collateral attack was out-
weighed by the social cost of releasing guilty defendants.2'
It is arguable that the rule of standing is no longer justifiable after
Kaufman. Allowing defendants to assert search and seizure claims on
collateral attack will have virtually no deterrent effect on law-enforce-
ment officers because the incidence of such cases is relatively rare and
"as unforeseeable as the flip of a coin." ' Furthermore, the existence
of such a remedy may result in the loss of relevant evidence at criminal
trials,m and decreases the probability that a criminal judgment will be
final.24
On the other hand, just two weeks before deciding Kasufman, the
Court in Alderman v. United States 5 reaffirmed the doctrine of stand-
-19394 U.S. 217 (1969).
20 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1964) gives prisoners convicted under an act of Congress the
right to "move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct
the sentence."
21394 U.S. at 225 (emphasis added):
[W]e have already rejected this approach with respect to the availability of
the federal habeas corpus remedy to state prisoners. This rejection was
premised in large part on a recognition that the availability of collateral
remedies is necessary to insure the integrity of proceedings at and before trial
where constitutional rights are at stake.
22 Amsterdam, supra note 7, at 390.
23The loss of evidence will be most significant in this situation because it will
result in the retrial of a person who has already been adjudged guilty of criminal
conduct.
24 See Amsterdam, supra note 7, at 383-84. See generally Bator, Finality in
Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HAv. L. REV.
441 (1963).
25394 U.S. 165 (1969).
1970]
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ing and specifically stated that it is premised on the notion that in
certain cases the additional deterrent effect gained through exclusion
does not outweigh the social cost of excluding relevant evidence at a
criminal trial.26  Thus Kaufman does not augur the end of standing.
Indeed, a social planner could suggest that since Kaufman closed one
avenue by which courts can prevent the exclusionary rule from operating
beyond the point of optimal deterrence, some broadening of the other
avenues, of which standing is one, is desirable.
Pending the availability of the data necessary to locate the point
of "optimal deterrence," some working assumptions are necessary. Our
first premise is that the exclusionary rule significantly deters the police
in certain situations.17  It is only reasonable that the police are gen-
erally deterred from making an unlawful search when their primary
incentive for making the search is removed. Given both the Court's
commitment to the exclusionary rule ' and its acknowledgment that the
rule does not operate when only marginal deterrence is gained,30 our
second assumption is that, ordinarily, the social cost of excluding rele-
vant evidence should be incurred only when it is likely to deter un-
reasonable searches. Working on these assumptions, the remainder of
this Article will show that the present rules of standing do not strike
a proper balance between effective deterrence of unreasonable searches
and admission of relevant evidence, and that there are more appropriate
means to achieve this end.
II. THE PRESENT LAW OF STANDING
A. Jones v. United States
Derived from the common law rules of trespass to real property,3'
the law of standing originally applied to only a narrow class of per-
26Id. at 175.
27See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
28 For instance, in People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 448, 282 P2d 905, 913
(1955), it was stated:
Granted that the adoption of the extlusionary rule will not prevent all illegal
searches and seizures, it will discourage them. Police officers and prosecuting
officials are primarily interested in convicting criminals. Given the exclusion-
ary rule and a choice between securing evidence by legal rather than illegal
means, officers will be impelled to obey the law themselves since not to do so
will jeopardize their objectives.
29 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
30 See Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 175 (1969).
3 1 See Edwards, Standing to Suppress Unreasonably Seized Evidence, 47 Nw.
U. L. Rxv. 471 (1952).
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sons,32 presented subtle technical questions concerning property inter-
ests, and resulted in confusing and contradictory decisions."
In the landmark case of Jones v. United States,3 4 the Supreme
Court declared:
[I]t is unnecessary and ill-advised to import into the law
surrounding the constitutional right to be free from unreason-
able searches and seizures subtle distinctions, developed and
refined by the common law in evolving the body of private
property law .... 35
Justice Frankfurter wrote for the Court:
In order to qualify as a "person aggrieved by an unlawful
search and seizure" one must have been a victim of a search
or seizure, one against whom the search was directed, as dis-
tinguished from one who claims prejudice only through the
use of evidence gathered as a consequence of a search or
seizure directed at someone else.3
Frankfurter defined "directed at" by stating that one will only have
standing if he establishes "that he himself was the victim of an invasion
of privacy." 37 While this basic requirement did not deviate from the
rule prior to Jones,3 the decision redefined the law of standing in two
ways. First, the Court removed the dilemma that had previously con-
fronted defendants who, in order to establish standing, were forced to
claim that they either owned or had a possessory interest in the property
searched, although this admission could be later used in a criminal
prosecution against them. For example, if to establish standing, Jones
claimed that he was in possession of narcotics that had been illegally
seized by the police, this testimony could be used against him at his
32 If the defendant was the owner, but not the occupant, he was denied standing
to exclude evidence obtained by means of the illegal search and seizure. See id. 472-76.
Application of these property rules resulted in a denial of standing to guests, Gaskins v.
United States, 218 F2d 47 (D.C. Cir. 1955) ; In re Nassetta, 125 F.2d 924 (2d Cir.
1942), to employees, Kelly v. United States, 61 F2d 843 (8th Cir. 1932) ; and to
other individuals whose possessory interest in the seized property was slight and
temporary, e.g., Lewis v. United States, 92 F.2d 952 (10th Cir. 1937).
33 Ascertaining whether the defendant had "possession" of the article involved
was a complex task. Compare United States v. Blok, 188 F.2d 1019 (D.C. Cir. 1951),
with United States v. Ebeling, 146 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1944).
34 362 U.S. 257 (1960). Jones was a guest in the apartment of a friend, which
he was allowed to use at will. He kept a suit and shirt at the apartment, although
his home was elsewhere. Prior to his arrest, he had slept there "maybe a night."
Pursuant to a search warrant naming Jones and another woman as occupants of the
apartment, police searched the premises for narcotics. Jones was the only person
present.
35 Id. at 266.
3Id. at 261.
37 Id.
38 See text accompanying notes 31-33 4upra.
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trial for illegal possession of narcotics. 9 To resolve the dilemma, the
Court held that when a defendant faced such a choice, he had standing,
and the Court would not look to see if there was an interest in the
premises searched or the property seized.'O
Second, while it emphasized that in other cases the defendant
would have to satisfy the traditional requirement of showing the req-
uisite interest in the premises searched or the property seized, the Court
enlarged the definition of that interest to include anyone legitimately
on the premises at the time of an unlawful search.4'
B. Later Interpretations of Jones
While Jones established basic guidelines to use in determining
standing, state and lower federal courts were left with the problem of
giving more precise definition to the articulated criteria. Recent de-
cisions of the Supreme Court make this task more difficult by question-
ing, both explicitly and implicitly, the viability of the Jones tests. The
present status of standing is best understood by examining separately
the development of the two basic refinements of Jones.
1. Standing to Avoid the Dilemma
To resolve the dilemma posed for defendants prior to Jones the
Court held that when one is faced with a situation in which objecting to
the introduction of evidence by admitting to ownership or possession
would also be admitting commission of a crime, the defendant auto-
matically has standingY In general, the lower courts have limited
application of this doctrine to cases in which the government is seeking
to obtain a conviction for a possessory crime on the basis of the de-
fendant's possession of the evidence at the time of the search.43 The
39 Fowler v. United States, 239 F2d 93 (10th Cir. 1956) ; Heller v. United States,
57 F2d 627 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 286 U.S. 567 (1932).
40
The same element in this prosecution which has caused a dilemma, i.e., that
possession both convicts and confers standing, eliminates any necessity for a
preliminary showing of an interest in the premises searched or the property
seized, which ordinarily is required when standing is challenged.
362 U.S. at 263.
41
No just interest of the Government in the effective and rigorous enforcement
of the criminal law will be hampered by recognizing that anyone legitimately
on premises where a search occurs may challenge its legality by way of a
motion to suppress, when its fruits are proposed to be used against him.
Id. at 267.
4 2 Id. at 263.
43 Niro v. United States, 388 F.2d 535 (lst Cir. 1968) ; Banks v. Pepersack, 244
F. Supp. 675 (D. Md. 1965) ; United States v. Thomas, 216 F. Supp. 942 (N.D. Cal.
1963); People v. Vaglica, 99 II1. App. 2d 194, 240 N.E2d 271 (1968); State v.
Cadigan, - Me. -, 249 A.2d 750 (1969). But see Stewart v. State, 1 Md. App. 309,
229 A.2d 727 (1967).
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Third Circuit, however, has held that even in this situation, the defendant
is not entitled to standing where "possession is only one element of the
crime charged." "
In cases where the government seeks to establish a prima facie case
based on the defendant's possession of the evidence at the time of the
search, courts generally allow the accused standing.45 However, in
cases where "conviction [does] not flow from the [defendant's] posses-
sion . . . [of the evidence] at the time of search," 46 a majority of
courts refuse to extend the "standing to avoid the dilemma" principle to
situations where possession of the goods in question is either an ele-
ment 47 or prima facie evidence 4  of the crime charged. No court
allows a defendant standing on the theory that an admission of posses-
sion or ownership would tend to convict him of a crime.49
If statements made by the defendant at a preliminary motion to
suppress evidence can be used against him at trial,50 the cases narrowly
limiting the operation of the "dilemma" principle are improper. A
defendant charged with unlawful possession of goods stolen in inter-
state commerce who must admit possession of the stolen goods to estab-
lish standing " is faced with a choice no less gruesome than the one
44United States v. Konigsberg, 336 F2d 844, 847 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 933 (1964). Since possession of narcotics was not the sole element of the crimes
charged in Jones, Konigsberg is directly in conflict with the Supreme Court holding.
See also United States v. Wood, 270 F. Supp. 963 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (applying the
Konigsberg rationale in a situation in which the defendant was not in possession of
the evidence seized at the time of the search).
45 Simpson v. United States, 346 F2d 291 (10th Cir. 1965); Plazola v. United
States, 291 F.2d 56 (9th Cir. 1961) ; United States v. Festa, 192 F. Supp. 160 (D.
Mass. 1960). But see Williams v. United States, 323 F2d 90 (10th Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 376 U.S. 906 (1964) ; Harper v. State, - Nev. -, 440 P.2d 893 (1968).
46 E.g., United States v. Beigel, 370 F2d 751, 756 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S.
930 (1967).
47 See Seay v. United States, 380 F.2d 358 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
1047 (1968) ; United States v. Coots, 196 F. Supp. 775 (E.D. Tenn. 1961) ; Ball v.
State, - Miss. -, 194 So. 2d 502 (1967); People v. Estrada, 23 N.Y2d 719, 244
N.E2d 57, 296 N.Y.S.2d 364 (1968), cert. denied, - U.S. - (1969). But see
Velasquez v. Rhay, 408 F2d 9 (9th Cir. 1969) ; United States v. Lewis, 270 F. Supp.
807 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), aff'd, 392 F2d 377 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 891 (1968).
48United States v. Cowan, 396 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1968); Woodring v. United
States, 367 F.2d 968 (10th Cir. 1966) ; People v. Cefaro, 21 N.Y2d 252, 234 N.E2d
423, 287 N.Y.S2d 371 (1967). But see United States ex rel. Coffey v. Fay, 344 F.2d
625 (2d Cir. 1965).
49See United States v. Grosso, 358 F,2d 154 (3d Cir. 1965), rev'd on other
grounds, 390 U.S. 62 (1968) ; Ramirez v. United States, 294 F.2d 277 (9th Cir. 1961) ;
United States ex rel. Smith v. Reincke, 239 F. Supp. 887 (D. Conn.), affd on other
grounds, 354 F2d 418 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 993 (1966).
50 justice Frankfurter commented only briefly on this point in Jones:
[The defendant] has been faced . . . with the chance that the allegations
made on the motion to suppress may be used against him at the trial, although
that they may is by no means an inevitable holding .
362 U.S. at 262.
51 United States v. Konigsberg, 336 F.2d 844 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
933 (1964).
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which confronted Cecil Jones. Similarly, a defendant who must admit
ownership or possession of marked money used for the purpose of
purchasing narcotics to secure standing finds himself in an equally un-
enviable position.'
However, in Murphy v. Waterfront Commission 53 the Court pro-
tected the defendants' fifth amendment rights by holding that while
they could be required to answer questions put by a two-state investi-
gating commission which had granted them immunity from state
prosecution, their testimony could not be used against them in any
subsequent federal prosecution. This suggests that the "dilemma"
problem might be solved by restricting the prosecution's subsequent
use of defendant's pretrial testimony rather than by automatically grant-
ing standing. This approach would protect fifth amendment rights
while keeping the standing doctrine faithful to the purposes of the
exclusionary rule.
In Simmons v. United States," the Court used the Murphy doctrine
to hold that testimony given by a defendant at a pre-trial motion to
suppress evidence cannot be used as part of the Government's case
in chief against the defendant. On the basis of this holding, a de-
fendant caught in the Jones dilemma could establish the interest neces-
sary for standing without fear that his words would be used against
him at trial. In fact, there is language in Miranda v. Arizona5 5 which,
if read in light of Simmons, suggests that such testimony could not even
be used for impeachment. Miranda says that impeaching statements
are incriminating and are, therefore, admissible only if the defendant
makes them after effective waiver of his privilege against self-incrim-
ination.5 6 Simmons holds that a defendant testifying at a hearing on
a fourth amendment claim does not waive his privilege.5 7  It seems,
therefore, that the defendant is protected against any use of this testi-
mony at his trial."8
52 Ramirez v. United States, 294 F.2d 277 (9th Cir. 1961).
5378 U.S. 52 (1964).
54390 U.S. 377 (1968).
55 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
56Id. at 477. But cf. Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954) (holding that
where a defendant testified on direct examination that he had never possessed any
heroin, the prosecution could introduce evidence of heroin unlawfully seized in con-
nection with an earlier proceeding for the purpose of impeaching his credibility).
57390 U.S. at 394.
58 The dilemma is not entirely eliminated because there still exists the possibility
of a subsequent perjury prosecution if trial and pretrial statements are inconsistent.
However, in a conversation on June 23, 1969, Paul Michel, Assistant District Attorney
in charge of the Miscellaneous Court Bureau in Philadelphia, stated that there is a
general feeling among American prosecutors that this type of action should not be
brought, and that in the past 10 years there have been none in Philadelphia. Thus,
this danger seems quite small.
[Vol.118:333
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
If Simmons adequately protects the fifth amendment right of de-
fendants who wish to establish standing, is there any basis for continued
application of the "standing to avoid the dilemma" rule? Justice Frank-
furter suggested an alternative basis for the rule in the following lan-
guage from Jones:
The prosecution here thus subjected the defendant to the
penalties meted out to one in lawless possession while refusing
him the remedies designed for one in that situation. It is not
consonant with the amenities, to put it mildly, of the adminis-
tration of criminal justice to sanction such squarely contra-
dictory assertions of power by the Government.5"
This statement articulates a principle of estoppel based on the belief that
the Government's high standard of responsibility in the administration
of the criminal law should preclude it from profiting from conspicuous
and unseemly inconsistencies."° While this principle can properly be
applied in a case like Jones in which the Court exercises its supervisory
power over lower federal courts, its application to state courts as a
matter of federal constitutional law is questionable. While minimum
constitutional standards of propriety are imposed on state prosecutors,"'
no Supreme Court case has ever suggested that the state government
may not attempt to gain a conviction by asserting inconsistent positions
at two separate stages in the criminal process. Thus, Frankfurter's
rationale would probably support the retention of the "standing to avoid
the dilemma" principle only in federal cases.62
Despite Simmons' apparent undermining of the "dilemma" portion
of Jones, no court has indicated a willingness to discard or alter the
principle of conferring standing to avoid the dilemma. In fact, one
federal court has given an unusually broad interpretation to the prin-
ciple by granting standing to a defendant in a case where the Govern-
ment was not claiming that he had possession at the time of the search
59 362 U.S. at 263-64.
00 The inconsistency results from the government first taking the position on a
motion to suppress that defendant did not own or possess certain evidence at the time
of a search, only to later claim at trial that he did.
61See Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1 (1967) (knowing use by the prosecution of
false evidence is a denial of due process) ; Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959)
(due process was violated at defendant's murder trial when the prosecution did nothing
to correct the false statement of the state's principal witness that he received no
consideration in return for his testimony).
62 In cases where the government is seeking to obtain a conviction on the theory
that the defendant possessed the evidence in question at a time prior to the search,
see, e.g., United States v. Cowan, 396 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1968), Justice Frankfurter's
rationale would not apply, because the government could consistently take the position
that at the time of the search the defendant did not have sufficient possessory interest
in the items seized to be entitled to standing.
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and was not, therefore, taking inconsistent positions.63 Yet it is cer-
tainly apparent that Murphy and Simmons 64 make the rule less neces-
sary. Courts that continue blindly to allow standing to avoid a
theoretical dilemma may find that they are applying a rule without a
reason. If that is true, the rule ought to be scrapped.
2. The Requisite Interest in the Premises Searched
or Property Seized
Jones did not purport to discard the notion that standing could be
established by showing a possessory or proprietary interest in either the
premises searched or the property seized."3 The case merely added an
additional interest to the interests protected by the fourth amendment-
an interest established by being "legitimately on [the] premises" at the
time of the search. 6
Justice Frankfurter's recognition of this new protected interest has
had a major impact. With few exceptions, 7 courts have literally ap-
plied this language and held that standing will automatically be con-
ferred on anyone legitimately on the premises at the time of a searh."5
63 Glisson v. United States, 406 F.2d 423, 427 (5th Cir. 1969). If the defendant's
motion to suppress was heard before Simmons was decided (March 18, 1968), the
defendant could claim that Simmons is inapplicable because at the time of the hearing,
he was inhibited from testifying by his fear that any testimony given would be used
against him at his trial. In view of Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52
(1964), a defendant making this claim should only be entitled to a new hearing on the
motion to suppress. At the new hearing, he could testify without fear that his testi-
mony could later be used against him.
64 At least one court has noted that Simmons may have the effect of undermining
the standing to avoid the dilemma principle established in Jones. Commonwealth v.
Rowe, 433 Pa. 14, 17 n.3, 249 A.2d 911, 912 n.3 (1969).
65 For a discussion of the derivation of the law of standing from ancient property
concepts, see notes 31-33 supra & accompanying text. Even after Jones, the vestiges of
property law have not been entirely divorced from the application of the fourth
amendment. For instance, authorities have split on whether to grant standing to a
defendant who is in unlawful possession of the premises searched or the property
seized. Cases have held that a driver of a stolen car does not have standing to object
to a search, because he has no lawful property interest in the car. E.g., Harper v.
State, - Nev. -, 440 P.2d 893 (1968). Contra, Cotton v. United States, 371 F.2d
385 (9th Cir. 1967).
06 See 362 U.S. at 267.
17 See Thomas v. United States, 394 F.2d 247 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 931 (1969) (defendant who agreed to take police to the searched premises held
not to have standing); Ramirez v. United States, 294 F.2d 277 (9th Cir. 1961)
(defendant who was in a narcotics agent's room at the time his wife's purse was
searched held not to have standing).
06 See, e.g., Garza-Fuentes v. United States, 400 F2d 219 (5th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 963 (1969) (defendants had arrived a few minutes before the police) ;
Montoya v. United States, 392 F.2d 731 (5th Cir. 1968) (defendant was a guest in a
hotel room she did not sign for) ; United States v. Pisano, 191 F. Supp. 861
(S.D.N.Y. 1961) (defendant was an employee in a store). A defendant who has at
least as much access to the premises searched as Jones had to his friend's apartment
is generally granted standing. Villano v. United States, 310 F2d 680 (10th Cir. 1962)
(employee has standing to object to search of the desk where he worked) ; Burge v.
United States, 333 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 829 (1965) (house
guest has standing to object to a search of a bathroom which he shared with the lessee
of the apartment).
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In some cases, application of this rule seems unduly rigid. For ex-
ample, if a casual visitor happens to be on the premises at the time the
police arrive, he will have standing; '9 yet, if he leaves the premises one
minute before the police arrive or delays his visit until after the police
have made their search, he will not.'0
Mancusi v. DeForte "7 may signal a shift from a rigid application
of the "legitimately on the premises" test. State officials, acting with-
out a warrant, seized union records from an office shared by DeForte and
several other union officials. DeForte, who was present at the time
of the search, objected. Although the Court recognized that DeForte
clearly had standing under the "legitimately on the premises" test,72 it
went on to state:
The Court's recent decision in Katz v. United States, also
makes it clear that capacity to claim the protection of the
Amendment depends not upon a property right in the invaded
place but upon whether the area was one in which there was
a reasonable expectation of freedom from governmental in-
trusion. The crucial issue, therefore, is whether, in light of
all the circumstances, DeForte's office was such a place. 3
The Court held that under this rationale DeForte should have standing
because
DeForte . . . could reasonably have expected that only [the
union officials sharing the office] and their personal or
business guests would enter the office, and that records would
not be touched except with their permission or that of union
higher-ups. 4
To strengthen its conclusion, the Court compared DeForte's ex-
pectation of privacy with that of Cecil Jones, and concluded that under
the specific holding of Jones, DeForte should be granted standing75
Rather than serving to support the holding, emphasis on the facts in
Jones only makes the decision confusing. As Justice Black correctly
pointed out in his dissent, if the majority was relying on the "legiti-
mately on the premises" test, there was no need for any analysis of
"reasonable expectations." 7'
49 See, e.g., State v. Cadigan, - Me. -, 249 A2d 750 (1969).
'74Bitt see Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969) (defendant is treated
as though he were on premises at the time of a search when police delay search until
he leaves those premises).
71392 U.S. 364 (1968).
72 Id. at 368-69.
73 Id. at 368 (citations omitted).
"74Id. at 369.
75 Id. at 370.
TO Id. at 376.
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In his concurring opinion in Katz v. United States,77 Justice Harlan
emphasized that the reason the fourth amendment is violated when fed-
eral officers use electronic listening devices to overhear statements made
by a defendant in a public phone booth is that the booth is a temporarily
private place, and its occupants are reasonably entitled to rely on freedom
from intrusion. Similarly, Justice Harlan, writing for the majority in
Mancusi, states that the defendants in both Jones and Mancusi are en-
titled to standing because they had "reasonable expectations" of
privacy.
7 8
The concept of "reasonable expectations" is difficult to apply. 9 Its
probable focus is on the extent of one's interest in the area searched. At
some point, the individual has a sufficient interest in an area to "reason-
ably expect" that his privacy will not be unlawfully invaded. Justice
Harlan's citation in Mancusi of the "legitimately on the premises" lan-
guage from Jones may indicate that the Jones test has not been altered-
anyone legitimately on the premises at the time of the search may have
the requisite interest. On the other hand, his emphasis on the specific
facts of the two cases may indicate that a defendant will not have stand-
ing unless he has as much interest in the area searched as Jones and
DeForte. If the latter reading of the Court's intent is correct, Mancusi
would severely reduce the number of cases in which defendants can
object to illegal searches.'
III. TOWARD A RATIONAL RULE OF STANDING
A. Problems With the Present Law
Under present tests for determining standing, the defendant must
have been a "victim" of the illegal search, in the sense that he suffered
77389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967).
78 392 U.S. at 370.
79 For example, it would be absurd to deny Katz standing merely because, as a
professional gambler, he would reasonably expect federal agents to monitor his calls.
Compare, Bishop, Privacy v. Protection--The Bugged Society, N.Y. Times, June 8,
1969, § 6 (Magazine), at 30.
8o Later decisions have done little to clarify the meaning of Mancusi. In Alderman
v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969), the Court held that a defendant would have
standing to object to evidence obtained by unlawful electronic surveillance if the
government unlawfully overheard his conversations or those of others occurring on his
premises, whether or not he was present. Id. at 176. The Court's apparent failure
to protect people "legitimately on the premises" at the time of the wiretap may indi-
cate that it accepts a restrictive reading of Mancusi. On the other hand, since special
factors must be taken into account in formulating rules of standing in wiretapping
cases, the Court's holding may have no application to rules of standing in other areas
of search and seizure. See text accompanying notes 145-71 infra.
Two recent state cases have broadly construed Justice Harlan's language in
Mancusi. See State v. Matias, - Hawaii -, 451 P2d 257 (1969) ; Commonwealth
v. Rowe, 433 Pa. 14, 249 A2d 911 (1969).
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an invasion of privacy, before he will be afforded standing to exclude
the illegally obtained evidence. He will not have standing to complain
that an illegal search of a third party was in reality directed at him.'1
Three examples will serve to illustrate the application of this prin-
ciple. First, in United States v. Konigsberg,n2 investigation by federal
agents led them to believe that a certain garage was being used by
defendant Zax and others temporarily to store stolen clothes. During
their surveillance of the garage, the agents observed piles of suits on
the garage floor and in a nearby automobile. They immediately arrested
the four men on the scene. Zax was arrested the following day. When
the five men were tried for unlawful possession of stolen goods, the court
held that none of the defendants had standing to object to the search.'2
The second example is Ramirez v. United States,4 involving a
special employee of the Bureau of Narcotics who twice purchased
narcotics from the defendant with marked money. Although he prin-
cipally conducted business with the defendant, the agent also spoke to
the defendant's wife over the phone concerning future narcotics trans-
actions. When the defendant and his wife were arrested, a search of
the wife's purse disclosed some of the marked money. Since the de-
fendant and his wife both claimed that the money belonged to her, the
court held that the defendant had no standing to challenge the search
of his wife's purse.
In Parker v. United States,"5 the third illustration, pursuant to a
search warrant issued on August 19, federal agents searched suspect
8 1 See, e.g., Parker v. United States, 407 F2d 540 (9th Cir. 1969) ; Parman v.
United States, 399 F2d 559 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 858 (1968); United
States v. Cowan, 396 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1968) ; Sumrall v. United States, 382 F.2d
651 (10th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1055 (1968) ; Seay v. United States, 380
F.2d 358 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1047 (1968) ; United States v. Konigs-
berg, 336 F.2d 844 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 933 (1964); United States v.
Hopps, 331 F2d 332 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 820 (1964).
82336 F.2d 844 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 933 (1964).
3The court held that the defendants had not established that they were legiti-
mately on the premises because Zax testified that he had leased the garage to a Mr.
Pope. Id. at 846. The court also rejected the defendants' argument that standing
should be conferred because conviction of the crime charged flowed from their posses-
sion of the evidence seized. Id. at 847. See notes 43-45 supra.
84294 F.2d 277 (9th Cir. 1961).
85407 F2d 540 (9th Cir. 1969). In Simpson v. United States, 346 F2d 291
(10th Cir. 1965), the court recognized the problems caused by denying standing to a
defendant who is the target of police investigation. In Simpson, officers suspected
that the defendant was in possession of a stolen car. Incident to an unlawful arrest
they made an unlawful search of the car. In rejecting the government's argument
that the defendant should be denied standing to object to the search of the car because
he had no right of ownership in it, the court said:
Such a construction of the Fourth Amendment would totally negate the effect
of the Weeks-McNabb exclusionary rule in regard to automobiles. Federal
officers could search cars at will and, of all defendants prosecuted for auto-
mobile theft, only those who actually owned the automobile could raise Fourth
Amendment objections successfully. Moreover, the proof of ownership would
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Parker's house and found $18,000 in counterfeit money. Pursuant to
a second search warrant issued on August 20, they searched the house
of suspect Slaney and found a small printing press. The court held that
Parker could not object to introduction into evidence of the printing
press because he had no standing to object to a search of Slaney's house.
Since the officers in all three cases apparently made the searches in
question primarily for the purpose of obtaining evidence against the
people who were later tried, knowledge on their part that these people
did not have standing to challenge the search might have influenced
their decision whether or not to make the search. For example, if the
agents in Parker only desired to obtain evidence for use against Parker,
they might have said to themselves: "If we search Slaney's house,
Parker will have no standing to object. Since we are only interested in
obtaining evidence against Parker, we will proceed with the search with-
out regard to whether it is reasonable under the fourth amendment."
Thus, in a significant number of cases, s6 the present rule of standing has
the potential not only to dissipate the deterrent effect of the exclusionary
rule, but also to foster cynicism in law enforcement officers by providing
them with an opportunity readily to circumvent its operation. If stand-
ing is to be retained, the reason for retention will be that the rule bears
a reasonable relation to the deterrent objective of the exclusionary rule.
In its present form it merely encourages the police to search the homes
of people they believe to be innocent, leaving the privacy of those they
believe to be guilty undisturbed. This encouragement is certainly not
consistent with the purpose underlying exclusion. Therefore, a re-
furbished rule of standing must be introduced to eliminate these
anomalies.'
be sufficient to quash the prosecution for theft of the automobile. These
constitutional rights belong to the guilty as well as the innocent.
Id. at 294. The court held that on the basis of his possessory interest in the auto-
mobile the defendant must be granted standing. On rehearing, it added that the
defendant should also be granted standing so that he would not have to testify on a
motion to suppress that he was in possession of a stolen car. Id. at 295.
86 Cases cited note 81 supra. The precise frequency with which the present rules
deny standing to a defendant who was the target of the officer's investigation is not
easily determined. Since most cases do not consider the officer's subjective intent
in resolving issues of standing, a court's statement of facts will often leave no real
indication of the extent to which the police were investigating the defendant on trial
at the time of the search. Nothing in the recited facts gives any indication why the
search was made. See, e.g., Elbel v. United States, 364 F2d 127 (10th Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1014 (1967). See also United States v. Reyes, 280 F. Supp. 267
(S.D.N.Y. 1968); United States v. Wood, 270 F. Supp. 963 (S.D.N.Y. 1967);
Schepps v. State, 432 S.W.2d 926 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968).
87 Some commentators assert that there is no significant danger that the police
will intentionally violate fourth amendment rights. See, e.g., Weeks, Standing to
Object in the Field of Search and Seizure, 6 ARiz. L. REv. 65, 79 (1964). However,
recent studies indicate that the police do not perceive themselves as violating the law
when they infringe upon the constitutional rights of a criminal defendant. See J.
SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL (1966); cf. A. NIEDERHOFFER, BEHIND THE
SHIELD (1967).
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B. A Proposed Rule
To achieve maximum deterrent impact while eliminating the prob-
lems in cases like Konigsberg, Ramirez, and Parker, courts should at-
tempt to assess the effect which admitting illegally obtained evidence in
one case will have on law enforcement officers in future cases. This
policy can best be implemented by focusing on the extent to which the
officer intended at the time of the search to find evidence relating to the
defendant. If an officer sought to obtain evidence against A and had
no interest whatsoever in finding evidence against B, information con-
cerning the probable admissibility of the evidence against A would have
a major impact on the officer's conduct. On the other hand, knowledge
of the probable admissibility of the evidence against B would not in-
fluence the officer, since by hypothesis he had no reason to believe that
B had committed an offense. If this analysis is adopted, standing will
not turn on the extent to which the defendant's privacy was invaded,
but rather on the extent to which the officer intended to find evidence
against the defendant when he searched."
Such an approach is not without judicial support. In Rosencranz
v. United States I the majority held that Rosencranz should have stand-
ing because he was a codefendant of the victim of an unlawful invasion
of privacy.90  In a concurring opinion, Judge Aldrich suggested his
notion of a proper basis for granting standing:
[T]he real basis of the exclusionary rule is its effect as a
police deterrent, and . . . the rule should be fashioned to
deter the accomplishment of whatever purpose the police were
improperly attempting to further. I believe, accordingly, that
the present defendants' rights . . . stem from their own
status as parties against whom the search was directed.9
88 Adopting a rule which grants standing to an individual solely on the basis of
whether prosecution against him was intended in some cases arguably discards a
notion that standing should not be given to A to assert the constitutional rights of B.
If only B's house is searched to obtain evidence against A, if A can invoke the exclu-
sionary rule he is asserting the rights of B to be secure in his person, houses, papers,
and effects. One could try to get around this analysis by saying that in fact what is
happening is that the rights of A are being expanded: that he now has the right to
be proceeded against legally by the police. But to find that right in the fourth
amendment is a fiction. It is better to recognize the departure from a previous notion
of standing, and to state simply that to effect the objectives of Mapp such a departure
is necessary.
89 334 F2d 738 (1st Cir. 1964).
90 Id. at 740-41.
9 'Id. at 742. The majority refused to accept this reasoning and based its decision
on McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948). In Alderman v. United States,
394 U.S. 165, 173 n.7 (1969), the Court expressly repudiated this reading of McDonald
and held that a defendant does not have standing to object to evidence tainted by
illegal electronic surveillance merely because it would be inadmissible against a
codefendant.
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Two lower federal courts have explicitly granted a defendant
standing on the ground that at the time of the search he was the target
of the investigation.' In both cases illegal searches of the property of
third parties led to evidence which was used against the defendants.
The reasoning used by the courts to grant standing is illustrated by the
language in Binkiewics v. United States: 93
The search here involved was directed not just at Painten
[actual victim of the search] but also "against all those,
whether their identities were known or not," who might be
engaged in the commission of the crime.
Both cases interpret Jones in a manner consistent with the proposed
approach.
In Alderman v. United States,94 however, the Supreme Court made
it clear that it is not yet prepared to alter its interpretation of Jones:
Ordinarily . . . it is entirely proper to require of one who
seeks to challenge the legality of a search as the basis for
suppressing relevant evidence that he allege, and if the allega-
tion be disputed that he establish, that he himself was the
victim of an invasion of privacy.95
But in a dissenting opinion Mr. Justice Fortas urged the Court to read
Jones as holding that:
The Government violates [a defendant's] rights when it seeks
to deprive him of his liberty by unlawfully seizing evidence in
the course of an investigation of him and using it against him
at trial.96
If the proposed analysis suggested in this Article and in Justice
Fortas's dissent in Alderman is adopted, different outcomes would re-
sult in cases similar to Konigsber.q, Ramirez, and Parker, and a major
defect in the present opration of the exclusionary rule would be rem-
edied. Nevertheless, the formulation of a rule which will function in
92 Binkiewicz v. United States, 281 F. Supp. 233 (D. Mass. 1968) (alternative
holding) (defendant granted standing to object to introduction of evidence seized
illegally from apartment of codefendant) ; United States v. Birrell, 242 F. Supp. 191
(S.D.N.Y. 1965) (alternative holding), rev'd on other grounds, 400 F2d 93 (2d Cir.
1968) (defendant granted standing to object to introduction of documents seized
illegally from his attorney) ; cf. Baker v. United States, 401 F2d 958, 983 (D.C. Cir.
1968). Baker is discussed in the text accompanying notes 151-54 infra. See also
United States v. Masterson, 383 F2d 610, 613 (2d Cir. 1967) (dictum), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 954 (1968).
93 281 F. Supp. 233, 237 (D. Mass. 1968).
94 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
9 Id. at 173 (quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960)). For a
more thorough discussion of Alderman, see text accompanying notes 158-64 infra.
96 394 U.S. at 209 (emphasis added).
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all possible situations remains a complex task. An examination of four
general factual situations will illustrate the spectrum within which the
courts must operate when applying the proposed standard.
Police are often tempted to make illegal searches during the investi-
gation of a large conspiracvY Once the police have established that
several individuals are involved, they may deem it worthwhile to violate
the constitutional rights of one member of the conspiracy (particularly
a minor member) in order to obtain evidence for use against others."
The present rule of standing encourages such an approach because the
police know that the evidence which they seize in an unlawful search
will be suppressed only in the trial of the victim of the search. 9  How-
ever, if all members of the conspiracy were guaranteed standing, the
illegal search would be valueless to the police. In fact, it would cripple
their efforts to secure convictions.
A second common situation arises when officials conduct an illegal
search to obtain evidence related to both the suspect who is the im-
mediate subject of the search and the class of individuals who may
be connected with the criminal venture in some unknown way. A
narcotics investigation is an apt example.100 To law enforcement offi-
cers, "narcotics arrests are seen as a series of increasingly larger steps
up a ladder, at the top of which is the narcotics officer's prize: the
'source.' " o" As in the first example, the loss caused by the suppression
of evidence at the trial of the victim of the search is insignificant when
compared to the more important convictions which the search may make
possible. Granting standing to the entire class of unidentified suspects
would have a significant deterrent effect.
A third type of case develops when the police have only one suspect
for a certain crime, but in an illegal search aimed at him uncover evi-
dence which implicates others in the same crime.'0 2 In this situation,
97 See, e.g., United States v. Bozza, 365 F2d 206 (2d Cir. 1966).
98 Where the police invade the privacy of an individual whom they believe to be
the ringleader of a conspiracy, granting standing to a codefendant of this individual
will have only a slight deterrent effect. The police would probably not have made
the search if they had known that the evidence would not be admissible against the
ringleader. But see Note, Fruit of the Poisonous Tree-A Plea for Relevant Criteria,
115 U. PA. L. REv. 1136, 1141 (1967).
99 For other cases in which coconspirators were denied standing to object to a
search which invaded the privacy of one member of the conspiracy, see Matthews v.
United States, 407 F.2d 1371, 1383 (5th Cir. 1969) (appeal of Raymond Cook);
Sumrall v. United States, 382 F2d 651 (10th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1055
(1968); Granza v. United States, 377 F2d 746 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 939
(1967); Diaz-Rosendo v. United States, 357 F.2d 124 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 856 (1966); United States v. Reyes, 280 F. Supp. 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Rob-
inson v. State, - Miss. -, 219 So. 2d 916 (1969).
I OSee, e.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
101 J. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL 143 (1966).
102 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Rowe, 433 Pa. 14, 249 A.2d 911 (1969).
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the decision to conduct the illegal search is made with only the one
suspect in mind; the knowledge that any prospective defendants re-
vealed by the search would have standing would have little influence on
police action, since it is the identified suspect who is the primary concern
of the police. Granting standing to such unknown defendants would
therefore have little deterrent effect.
The fourth example is a variation of the preceding one. When the
police conduct an illegal search against one suspect, they occasionally
discover evidence leading to the indictment of another individual for a
different crime.' 3 In this case the police are solely interested in solving
one crime; the existence of the other is not a consideration in police
action relating to the first.0 4  Here again, granting standing to the new
defendant would have little or no impact on police conduct, because both
his existence and the crime were unforeseen at the time the decision to
search was made.
While the deterrence rationale may indicate that the defendant in
each succeeding example is less entitled to standing than the defendant
in the preceding one, no precise rule of standing can be formulated with-
out more knowledge concerning the way in which the exclusionary rule
operates and the value which society places on protecting fourth amend-
ment rights.' In attempting to formulate a rule to cover these various
situations, the assumptions on which the proposed approach is premised
must be kept in mind. First, the exclusionary rule should not operate
unless there is substantial likelihood that its operation will have a sig-
nificant deterrent effect on law enforcement officers. Second, the police
generally refrain from making an illegal search if they believe evidence
obtained thereby may not be introduced against the primary target of
their investigation.'0" Given these premises, which of the defendants
in the four situations discussed should be granted standing?
At the time the searches are made in either of the first two situa-
tions, the police are primarily interested in obtaining evidence against
either one or more of the actual defendants or at least the class of
people to which the defendant belonged. Thus, in both cases, there is
substantial risk that officers would make an unlawful search if they
thought evidence thus obtained would be used against those who subse-
quently become defendants. Accordingly, the defendants in such situa-
103 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Dirring, - Mass. -, 238 N.E2d 508 (1968).
104 For cases which are similar in this respect see Boyle v. United States, 395
F.2d 413 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1089 (1969); United States v.
Grosso, 358 F2d 154 (3d Cir. 1966), rev'd on other grounds, 390 U.S. 62 (1968);
United States v. Coots, 196 F. Supp. 775 (E.D. Tenn. 1961).
105 See text accompanying notes 5-26 srupra.
'
0 6 See text accompanying notes 28-30 supra.
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tions should be granted standing 'o 7 to maximize the deterrent potential
of the exclusionary rule.
At the time of the search in situations three and four, the primary
targets of the investigation are not the individuals who eventually
become defendants. Police officers are not likely to make an unlawful
search and seizure merely in the hope that evidence thus obtained could
be used against people who were not their targets at the time of the
search. Accordingly, the defendants in these cases should not be allowed
standing.
In determining the officer's target at the time of the search, the
focus should not be on the officer's statement of his intentions. To
resolve the question whether evidence illegally obtained should be ex-
cluded on the basis of such a statement is to allow the officer to make
the final determination on exclusion without proper judicial supervision.
Such a rule would be completely contrary to the spirit of the fourth
amendment. 08 Instead, the use of an objective standard is recom-
mended.' 9 The relevant question should be: against whom would a
reasonable man in the position of this officer primarily want to obtain
evidence? In many cases, the information the officer possessed at the
time of the search will indicate the target of the search." 0
From this analysis, then, the following rule of standing is recom-
mended: if a reasonable man in the officer's position at the time of the
search would seek to obtain evidence against either the defendant or the
class of people to 'which the defendant belongs, the defendant has
standing.
107 One could argue that in the first situation sufficient deterrence would be
achieved by granting standing to perhaps half or three-quarters of the conspirators.
However, since there is no rational way for a court to determine which members of
the conspiracy should be denied standing, the courts should grant all coconspirators
standing. In this way, sufficient deterrence is achieved and the court avoids appearing
capricious.
108 Cf. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-15 (1947)
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous
officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual infer-
ences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in
requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate
instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enter-
prise of ferreting out crime. Any assumption that evidence sufficient to sup-
port a magistrate's disinterested determination to issue a search warrant
will justify the officers in making a search without a warrant would reduce
the Amendment to a nullity and leave the people's homes secure only in the
discretion of police officers.
109 BWt cf. Robbins v. MacKenzie, 364 F.2d 45 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
913 (1966) ; Davis v. United States, 327 F.2d 301 (9th Cir. 1964). In each of these
cases an officer's statement describing his intent at the time of the search was used
by the court to determine the reasonableness of the search.
110 E.g., Commonwealth v. Rowe, 433 Pa. 14, 249 A.2d 911 (1969). The officers
made the search of Bailey's home after receiving a description which matched Bailey's
and learning that Bailey had recently purchased ammunition the same as that used
in the shooting. It is obvious that Bailey was the target of the search.
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Granting standing to an individual against whom, either as an
individual or as a member of a class, there was an intention to prosecute
should suffice to deter most unlawful searches. The only case not cov-
ered by such a rule is, of course, an individual not in the minds of the
police at the time of the search.1 11 Since no deterrent purpose would be
served by exclusion of evidence against that person and since deterrence
will be served by granting standing to the objects of the search, the rule
is justified.
However, in a case of flagrant abuse in which there is no particular
individual or class in mind-that presented, for instance, by a random
or area search-standing ought to be granted to all against whom evi-
dence is obtained. This should be done both because there is otherwise
no individual or class with standing and thus no deterrence at all, and
because that kind of search is particularly offensive to the values
protected by the fourth amendment."
2
C. Possible Objections to the Proposed Rule
Several courts have either expressly 113 or impliedly 114 rejected
this Article's approach." 5 One basis for these rejections was articulated
by Mr. Justice Harlan:
[T]he rule would entail very substantial administrative diffi-
culties. In the majority of cases, I would imagine that the
police plant a bug with the expectation that it may well pro-
duce leads as to a large number of crimes. A lengthy hearing
would, then, appear to be necessary in order to determine
whether the police knew of an accused's criminal activity at
the time the bug was planted and whether the police decision
to plant a bug was motivated by an effort to obtain information
against the accused or some other individual. I do not believe
that this administrative burden is justified in any substantial
degree by the hypothesized marginal increase in Fourth
Amendment protection.1
6
111 There is some danger that an officer knowing that illegally obtained evidence
would be suppressed might intentionally make an illegal search hoping that the evi-
dence seized would eventually lead to other evidence. However, in such a situation
the doctrine of the scope of the taint might be available to deter such activity. See
generally Pitler, supra note 11.
112 Such a search is not likely to be made very frequently by police. However,
with the aid of electronic techniques a random search is a real possibility. This special
kind of problem is treated at text accompanying notes 145-71 infra.
Another case which should be treated separately--coerced confessions-is dis-
cussed at text accompanying notes 123-44 infra.
"l3 E.g., Baker v. United States, 401 F2d 958, 983 n.115 (D.C. Cir. 1968). Baker
is discussed in the text accompanying notes 151-54 supra.
114 Cases cited note 81 supra.
115 The approach, that is, of having a rule of standing turn on the officer's probable
intent at the time of the search. Naturally, the feasibility of the specific rule which
the authors have advanced for consideration has not been discussed by the courts.
110 Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 188 n.1 (1969) (Harlan, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part).
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Probing the officer's intent at the time of an illegal search might lengthen
hearings on motions to suppress in some cases, but in light of the broad
examination of officers allowed by the courts on a motion to suppress,
examination on this additional issue would not appreciably prolong the
hearings, especially since no new witnesses would normally be called.
In any event, Justice Harlan's assumption that the new rule would
only "marginally" increase the fourth amendment protection is not
justified. There are already a relatively large number of reported cases
in which a defendant has been unable to challenge a search of a third
person although it was directed at the defendant." 7 The proposed rule
would plug a gaping hole in the present law of standing while being
true to the spirit of the exclusionary rule. This more than counter-
balances the social cost of minimally increased litigation." s
A more significant problem with the proposal lies in its ambiguity,
which gives unsympathetic trial judges an opportunity to draw infer-
ences in applying the proposed rule that would make it difficult for a
defendant to establish standing. Rather than allow the difficulty in
applying the test to encourage unlawful searches, the state should bear
the burden of proving that a reasonable man in the officer's position
would not have primarily intended to obtain evidence against the de-
fendant or the class of persons to which he belonged." 9 A further safe-
guard could be added in the form of an irrebuttable presumption that
police intend to obtain evidence against people whom they search and
against those who own or possess property that is searched. 20 This in
effect preserves the present law granting standing to individuals, the
sanctity of whose persons or houses has been violated by the police.
Another objection surely to be raised is that the proposed test
necessarily leads to uncertainty in the law of standing because courts
are denied clear guidelines. This objection is the result of a mis-
apprehension of the function of the standing requirement. Although
clear and predictable rules of search and seizure are essential, similar
117 Cases cited note 81 supra.
18 An unarticulated basis for Justice Harlan's objection may be a belief that the
new approach would exclude additional evidence from criminal trials. However, the
new method could easily be adjusted to accommodate a judgment that too much
evidence is being excluded from criminal trials. For example, the rule could be
formulated to deny a defendant standing unless he was the only person under investiga-
tion at the time of the search. See, e.g., Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543
(1968). Applied in place of the present rules, a rule of this type would decrease signifi-
cantly the number of defendants granted standing.
11 Presently the defendant has the burden of establishing standing to object to a
search and seizure. E.g., Murray v. United States, 333 F2d 409 (10th Cir. 1964),
vacated on other grounds, 380 U.S. 527 (1965).
120 See Baker v. United States, 401 F,2d 958, 983 n.115 (D.C. Cir. 1968). This
comports with the present law of standing, if there is such a creature. Cf. text accom-
panying notes 71-80 supra. However, it is inappropriate to presume as the court does
in Baker that anyone legitimately on the premises at the time of a search is a target
of the law enforcement officers' investigation. In many situations, the police would
have no interest in investigating all persons legitimately on searched premises.
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rules of standing are undesirable. If a policeman has no firm guidelines
defining legal searches, he will be more likely either to indulge in un-
desirable conduct or to refrain from that which is desirable.121 A rule
of standing, on the other hand, is solely for the purpose of determining
whether evidence unlawfully obtained should be excluded at trial.
While the proposed standing rule should induce police officers to believe
that evidence unlawfully obtained will probably be excluded, it should
not enable an officer to determine the exact circumstances under which
such evidence may be admitted. In fact, under present law, there is
too much danger that the officer will make this determination and then
decide that he will make an illegal search because the evidence thus
obtained will not be excluded from trial.
Thus, the law of standing should be formulated so that a knowl-
edgeable officer will be aware that evidence unlawfully obtained will
be admissible only when "a thin chain of unusual circumstances" 122
allows for an exception. The suggested rule attempts to achieve this
end. The absence of predictability would not detract in any way from
its effectiveness, but would insure that a police officer is constantly
conscious of the need for a legal search.
Pending more information concerning the way in which the ex-
clusionary rule works and the value which society places on a given
amount of additional deterrence, any rule can only be tentative. Some
people probably believe that if relatively few defendants are denied
standing, the doctrine ought to be abolished, rather than replaced with
complicated rules. However, it is the thesis of this Article that the
work involved in administering the standard is partially compensated
every time the denial of standing aids in convicting the perpetrator of
a serious crime. Whenever standing is denied, the operation of the
criminal law is improved. If only ten per cent of illegally obtained
evidence is admissible, the favorable impact on the operation of the
criminal law may be more than negligible. Without the exclusionary
rule, fourth amendment protections would be less precious. Without
standing, the purpose of exclusion is not served. With the standard
proposed herein, the fundamental principle of deterrence is preserved,
and standing becomes more meaningful.
IV. SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF STANDING
A. Problems of Standing Raised by Fifth Amendment Violations
Two variations of one hypothetical situation illustrate the special
problems of standing which arise when the violation of an individual's
121 Blakey, The Rule of Announcement and Unlawful Entry: Miller v. United
States and Ker v. California, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 499, 552 n.379 (1964).
122 Davis v. United States, 327 F2d 301, 306 (9th Cir. 1964).
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fifth amendment rights leads to the seizure of evidence. In the basic
hypothetical, police officers attempting to apprehend a gang of robbers
arrest A, a member of the gang, and take him to police headquarters.
Variation 1: Without advising A of his constitutional rights as
required by Miranda v. Arizona,2 3 the police ask A where the stolen
money is hidden. A tells the officers that it is hidden in the cellar of
B's house. A valid search warrant is obtained, the money is recovered,
and the state seeks to introduce it into evidence at B's trial for robbery. 12 4
Variation 2 : When the police question A concerning the location of
the money, he refuses to answer their questions. Thereupon, the police
beat A until he finally submits and reveals the location of the money.
Again a valid search warrant is obtained, the money is recovered, and
the police seek to introduce it into evidence at B's trial for robbery.
Two state cases 125 support the proposition that B has no standing
in variation 1 to object to the evidence. In People v. Varnum,,126 police
officers had in custody two murder suspects, a husband and wife. Al-
though he had not been warned of his constitutional rights, the husband
confessed to his participation in the killing. The police then asked him
to telephone his wife, who was confined in the women's jail, to ascertain
from her the location of the murder weapon. He complied with this
request and his wife divulged information which enabled the police to
find the gun. Although California has rejected the rule that a de-
fendant must have standing to object to an unlawful search and
seizure,127 the California Supreme Court held that the codefendant
Varnum could not object to the introduction of the revolver against
him. Chief justice Traynor articulated the basis of this holding:
Unlike unreasonable searches and seizures, which always
violate the Constitution, there is nothing unlawful in question-
ing an unwarned suspect so long as the police refrain from
physically and psychologically coercive tactics condemned by
due process and do not use against the suspect any evidence
obtained. Accordingly, in the absence of such coercive tactics,
there is no basis for excluding physical or other non-hearsay
evidence acquired as a result of questioning a suspect in dis-
12 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
124 Since A was not warned of his constitutional rights at the time he made the
statement, any evidence obtained as a result of the statement should not be admissible
against A unless the authorities prove they had an independent legitimate source for
the disputed evidence. See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 79 & n.18
(1964) ; text accompanying notes 53-54 supra.
=5 People v. Varnum, 66 Cal. 2d 808, 427 P2d 772, 59 Cal. Rptr. 108 (1967),
appeal disimissed & cert. denied, 390 U.S. 529 (1968) ; People v. Denham, 41 Ill. 2d 1,
241 N.E2d 415 (1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1006 (1969).
126 66 Cal. 2d 808, 427 P2d 772, 59 Cal. Rptr. 108 (1967), appeal dismissed & cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 529 (1968).
127 People v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755, 290 P.2d 855 (1955).
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regard of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights when such
evidence is offered at the trial of another person. 28
Despite the force of Justice Peters' dissent,"2- the holding in
Varnum is proper. Although there is some danger that anyone ques-
tioned by the police will be coerced into making a statement, Miranda
specifically reaffirmed the right of the police to question witnesses with-
out warning them of their rights. 3 While there is a greater danger of
coercion when the investigation focuses on a particular suspect, 3'
Miranda does not compel exclusion of evidence obtained by questioning
a suspect not warned of his constitutional rights, regardless of against
whom the evidence was to be used. Designed in part to reduce the
possibility of police coercion at the station-house,' the case also rested
on the principle that certain rules are necessary to safeguard a defend-
ant's privilege not to incriminate himself. 33 A defendant cannot in-
criminate himself in any meaningful sense unless his statements are
used against him. Unless the Court should clarify the scope of Miranda,
the decision ought to be interpreted to mean that when the police ques-
tion a suspect in their custody without warning him of his rights, they
are in effect giving him a chance to act as a witness without incrim-
inating himself. Under this interpretation, statements made by A in
variation 1 could be used against anyone but A, including B.
Chief Justice Traynor's language in Varnum implies that in varia-
tion 2, evidence obtained pursuant to a coerced confession will be inad-
missible against anyone.'34  Nevertheless, the court in People v.
Portelli ,'5 reached the opposite conclusion when a "small-time hood"
12866 Cal. 2d at 812-13, 427 P.2d at 776, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 112 (footnotes &
citations omitted).
129 Justice Peters argued that a constitutional violation occurs when a suspect is
questioned without being properly advised of his constitutional rights. Id. at 816-17,
427 P.2d at 778, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 114.
Judge Friendly has expressed a similar view:
It is not a satisfactory answer to say that . . . [in cases involving suspects]
the police may interrogate if they are willing to forego use at trial of admis-
sions or physical evidence thereby obtained. If the sixth amendment is
applicable, the right it confers is a right not to be questioned in the absence
of counsel unless the protection be waived-not simply to have answers ex-
cluded in a subsequent trial; such a right should be respected, and state
officers disregarding it would be subject to civil and criminal sanctions. Here,
as in the case of the fourth amendment, exclusion is only a remedy in aid
of a right; no one would suggest that the police may engage in unbridled
searches if they will dispense with the use of the provable fruits.
Friendly, The Bill of Rights As a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CALIF. L. REv.
929, 949 (1965) (footnotes omitted).
130 See 384 U.S. 436, 481 (1966).
1
3 1 See id. at 478.
13 2 See id. at 446-47.
133 See id. at 478-79.
334 66 Cal. 2d at 812-13, 427 P.2d at 776, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 112.
135 15 N.Y.2d 235, 205 N.E2d 857, 257 N.Y.S2d 931 (1965), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 1009 (1966).
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named Richard Melville testified that Portelli told him that he had shot
two police officers in the course of a holdup. On cross-examination,
Melville testified that he had been picked up for questioning by police
who were investigating the murder case. When Melville denied know-
ing anything about the murder, the police tortured him until he finally
disclosed the statement Portelli made to him. Emphasizing that his
testimony implicating Portelli was true, Melville testified that he would
not have given this testimony had it not been for the police coercion.
Yet the court held that Melville's testimony was admissible against
Portelli. Portelli is perhaps distinguishable from variation 2 in that
Melville's trial testimony, which occurred eight months after the beating,
could be considered a sufficiently independent act to purge the illegality
of the police coercion, whereas in variation 2 the search stemmed di-
rectly from the coerced confession.3 However, there is no evidence in
Portelli that the court based its decision on the fact that Melville's
testimony was an independent act. The opinion merely stressed that
Melville's testimony was trustworthy and that he could bring "charges
of misconduct" against the police in another forum.
137
If Portelli stands for the proposition that a defendant will never
have standing to object to evidence obtained through coercion of
another, it is wrong. In a line of cases extending from Brown v.
Mississippi 138 to Miranda v. Arizona ' 39 and beyond, the Supreme
Court has shown that it abhors confessions obtained through police
brutality. The late Justice Frankfurter enumerated some of the basic
tenets of our system of justice underlying this abhorrence:
Among these are the notions that men are not to be im-
prisoned at the unfettered will of their prosecutors, nor sub-
jected to physical brutality by officials charged with the in-
vestigation of crime. Cardinal among them, also, is the
conviction, basic to our legal order, that men are not to be
exploited for the information necessary to condemn them
before the law .... o
In Miranda, the Court cited Portelli as an example of the atrocities
which still occur. 4 ' The atrocity was not the introduction of evidence
136 Cf. United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532 (1947) (holding that a defendant's
invalid confession did not bar the admissibility of a confession made voluntarily by the
same defendant after he was given warning that what he said could be used against
him). See generally Hirtle, Inadmissible Confessions and Their Fruits: A Comment
on Harrison v. United States, 60 J. CRIm. L.C. & P.S. 58 (1969) ; Pitler, supra note 11.
'37 15 N.Y2d at 239, 205 N.E2d at 858. 257 N.Y.S2d at 933.
138297 U.S. 278 (1936).
139 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
140 Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 581 (1961) (emphasis added).
141384 U.S. at 446.
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against Melville; this never occurred. The atrocity lay in the brutal
extraction of information. A basic purpose of Miranda was to provide
safeguards to prevent the reoccurrence of such conduct." 4 To strengthen
these safeguards, a state should be prohibited from introducing evidence
against any defendant when the police have obtained that evidence by
coercion of another individual. 43 Thus, in variation 2, B should have
standing to object to the introduction of the evidence seized.'44
B. Problems of Standing in Electronic Surveillance Cases
Electronic surveillance 145 presents an unusual context for the ap-
plication of rules of standing. When governmental authorities conduct
an investigation by means of electronic surveillance, the extent of their
"search" is limited to conversations which they manage to overhear.
In many cases, there is no physical entry upon premises, and even
where entry occurs, the occupants are not disturbed. Difficulties arise,
therefore, in applying the Jones ... and Mancusi 147 rules of standing.
142 To deny safeguards to an individual in Melville's position would in effect
provide lesser protection to an innocent victim of coercion than it would to one who
was guilty. Since the fifth amendment would require exclusion of incriminiatng state-
ments made by a defendant under torture, the police are unlikely to resort to coercion
unless all lawful means of apprehending him prove futile. But if there is no similar
deterrent available to restrain the police from abusing an innocent person, the prob-
ability that they will do so is much enhanced.
143 A narrower rule might exclude evidence obtained from suspect A from the
trial of suspect B only when the police coerced the confession primarily for the
purpose of obtaining evidence against suspect B. However, since there is a special need
to deter physical brutality, a broader rule excluding all evidence obtained from a
coerced confession is preferable.
144 A third variation on the hypothetical case is presented in Long v. United States,
360 F2d 829 (D.C. Cir. 1966). In Long the state introduced a .38 calibre revolver
into evidence at the murder trial of 2 defendants. The defendants objected to the
evidence on the ground that the police had learned of the revolver's location after
questioning a juvenile in violation of the McNabb-Mallory rule. See Mallory v.
United States, 354 U.S. 449, 453 (1957); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 342
(1942). In an opinion by Judge Burger, the Court held that even if the juvenile had
been questioned in violation of Mallory, the defendants "could not raise the issue since
no right of theirs was violated."
The result in Long is questionable. Like the Miranda warnings, the McNabb-
Mallory rule is designed to reduce the possibility of coerced confessions. However,
the rule differs from Miranda in that it requires that the police "with reasonable
promptness show legal cause for detaining arrested persons." 354 U.S. at 452; 318
U.S. at 344. In effect, the rule decrees that federal officers may have lawful custody
of a suspect only for a limited time. If an arrested suspect is not brought before a
United States Commissioner within a reasonable period, the federal officers are guilty
of "willful disobedience of law." 354 U.S. at 453; 318 U.S. at 345. Thus, the
McNabb-Mallory rule sets forth a procedure which federal officers are required to
follow. When federal officers question suspect A in violation of Mallory primarily
for the purpose of obtaining evidence for use against suspect B, the evidence thus
obtained should not be admissible against either A or B, if the deterrent is to be
effective.
145 In this discussion, electronic surveillance includes both wiretapping and eaves-
dropping unless otherwise specified.
146 Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
147 Mancusi v. Deforte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968).
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In Katz v. United States,148 federal agents, without a search warrant,
monitored phone calls made by the defendant from a public phone
booth. The Court held that the defendant had reasonably relied on the
privacy of the phone booth, making the eavesdropping an invasion of
his fourth amendment rights. The Court reversed its previous holding
that an electronic device does not invade an individual's privacy unless
the police physically trespass on his property. 49
Since the defendant in Katz had placed the monitored phone calls,
the Court was not asked to consider the standing issue. Katz, therefore,
left undecided whether an owner of premises in which monitored phones
were located, or in which an eavesdropping device was hidden, has
standing to object to the eavesdropping if he was not a party to the
conversation overheard by police officers. Moreover, if a guest who
was not a party to the conversation had been present during the wiretap,
it is unclear whether he would be entitled to standing. If Jones is read
literally, both the owner and the guest, being lawfully on the premises,
would appear to have standing to exclude the illegally-obtained evidence.
However, a restrictive reading of Mancusi might result in denial of
standing to a guest unless he had significant control over the area where
the wiretap occurred.'
Several courts have already employed the Jones and Mancusi doc-
trines to decide cases involving unlawful wiretapping. In Baker v.
United States,'- for example, the defendant was convicted of wilfully
attempting to evade payment of income taxes. In a pretrial motion to
suppress, the defendant claimed that the Government had obtained much
of its evidence by illegal electronic surveillance. The government con-
ceded that FBI agents conducted an illegal wiretap but denied that the
defendant had standing to suppress the records of the conversation.
Wiretapping was used at the offices of the defendant's business associates
and at a hotel suite to which the defendant had access at all times.
Monitored conversations in which the defendant had participated were
suppressed by the district court.
The defendant claimed on appeal that he possessed standing to
object to all monitored conversations. Reversing the district court, the
District of Columbia Circuit held that since the defendant had constant
access to the hotel suite, Jones and Mancusi required suppression of all
conversations monitored in the suite "whether or not [the defendant]
was a participant in, or present at, particular overheard conversa-
tions." 1' The court found that the defendant's relationship to, and
148389 U.S. 347 (1967).
149 Id. at 353. See Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
150 See text accompanying notes 71-80 supra.
1401 F2d 958 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
152 Id. at 984.
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interest in, the suite made the premises "a constitutionally protected
area from which he had a right to be free of unlawful governmental
intrusion." "'
But the court denied standing to the defendant to suppress all
conversations overheard at the offices of his business associates, since
he lacked the requisite "special relationship." "" On remand, the de-
fendant was entitled to examine conversations of unidentified con-
versants in order to move for suppression of those in which he could
prove he participated.
In People v. McDonnell,"' the New York Court of Appeals went
further than the Baker court. The defendant, charged with bookmak-
ing and conspiracy, had arranged with a couple for the use of their tele-
phone as an "answering service" for bookmaking and gambling opera-
tions. Because the telephone was actually maintained and used for the
defendant's benefit, the New York Court of Appeals held that under
Jones the defendant had standing to exclude the evidence obtained by
means of an illegal wiretap of the phone. 50 The court granted standing
to the defendant although he had not participated in the tapped con-
versations, had no possessory interest in the premises, and was not even
present at the time of the wiretap. Moreover, as Judge Keating in dis-
sent pointed out, the defendant's "primary concern throughout was to
avoid any interest or contact with the phone or premises." 15T
The defendant in McDonnell had significantly less control of the
premises than the defendant in Baker. Far from having free access to
the home, the defendant's only connection with the premises was that a
telephone was maintained there for his use and benefit, although he
himself never used it.
In Alderman v. United States,"s the Supreme Court considered
whether an owner of premises which was electronically bugged had
standing to object to evidence discovered thereby. Although the owner
was not a party to the conversations overheard by government agents,
he was incriminated by statements made by the persons conversing on
his premises. He based his claim of standing solely on his ownership
of the place which was the object of government surveillance. Holding
that the defendant had standing, the Court reasoned that conversations
overheard as a result of an illegal entry were subject to exclusion for
the same reason that the seizure of tangible property justifies the ex-
clusionary rule:
153 Id. at 983-84.
15
4 Id. at 984.
155 18 N.Y.2d 509, 223 N.E2d 785, 277 N.Y.S2d 257 (1966).
156 Id. at 510, 223 N.E2d at 786, 27.7 N.Y.S2d at 258.
157 d. at 512, 223 N.E2d at 788, 277 N.Y.S.2d at 260 (Keating, J. dissenting).
158 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
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The rights of the owner of the premises are as clearly invaded
when the police enter and install a listening device in his house
as they are when the entry is made to undertake a warrantless
search for tangible property; and the prosecution as surely
employs the fruits of an illegal search of the home when it
offers overheard third-party conversations as it does when it
introduces tangible evidence belonging not to the homeowner,
but to others.
1 59
The Court emphasized that Silverman v. United States, a case in
which the Court excluded evidence obtained by an electronic listening
device on the ground that there had been illegal physical entry of a
person's home, is still valid. 60
It is surprising that the Court did not rely on the more familiar
language of Jones to decide the case, but chose instead to emphasize
physical intrusion. In resting its holding on Silverman, the Court
raised doubts regarding the standing of an owner to exclude evidence
if surveillance is accomplished without a physical entry. If the owner
must show that the police committed a trespass before he is granted
standing, the technical difficulties inherent in cases decided before Katz
will emerge again.'"1 More important, the requirement of a physical
trespass is inconsistent with the Court's language in Katz:
[o]nce it is recognized that the Fourth Amendment protects
people-and not simply "areas"-against unreasonable
searches and seizures, it becomes clear that the reach of that
Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a
physical intrusion into any given enclosure. 62
Therefore, the Court's reversion to property concepts in wiretap cases
may signal a retreat from the broad language of that decision, even
though it indicated that property concepts would not be determinative.'63
Alderman certainly insures that an owner of a house receives
fourth amendment protection through the exclusionary rule in the event
of government eavesdropping accompanied by a trespass, but it may
also imply that a guest may be denied standing to exclude evidence of
third-party conversations implicating him. Alderman raises the possi-
bility that the Jones "legitimately on the premises" test will not be
applied in cases involving electronic surveillance. If this is truly a de-
parture from Jones, the reason may be that, as in Mancusi, the Court
159 Id. at 179-80.
160 394 U.S. at 180. Silverman is reported at 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
161 See, e.g., On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952) ; Goldman v. United
States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942) ; Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
162 389 U.S. at 353.
163 394 U.S. at 179 n.1.
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is focusing on the actual extent to which the defendant's privacy is
invaded. It is difficult to perceive a significant invasion of a guest's
privacy when the government does not overhear his conversation, and
does not disturb in any way his sitting throughout the evening in
his host's living room. The case may mean that a guest will only have
standing if the police physically intrude on the premises while he
is present.-64
Alderman indicates that the Supreme Court conceives standing in
wiretapping cases as a more limited concept than that envisioned by the
lower courts in Baker and McDonnell. In Alderman, the defendant's
ownership of the bugged premises was the decisive factor in the Court's
opinion. It is very doubtful whether Alderman will be extended to
afford standing to a defendant in the circumstances of Baker, where the
defendant did not own the suite or live there on a permanent basis.
That the Court would have reached the same result as the highest court
of New York in McDonnell is even more doubtful. The defendant
there lacked not only a proprietary interest in the house, but also free-
dom of access to the premises.
The purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unreasonable
searches and seizures by the police. This Article proposes that the
defendant should not have standing to object to an unlawful search and
seizure unless he was the target of the investigation. The authors be-
lieve that this rule of standing would strike an optimal balance between
deterrence and the social desirability of introducing relevant evidence.
However, the particularly clandestine nature of unlawful electronic
surveillance merits an exception to our proposed rule. Since unlawful
eavesdropping may jeopardize first amendment rights 165 by inhibiting
the free exchange of ideas, a greater degree of deterrence is desirable in
electronic surveillance searches than in searches for tangible material. 6
Moreover, unlawful eavesdropping is a great deal less "reasonable" than
any other type of illegal search .67 in that the police have difficulty con-
164 Justice Harlan in dissent took the majority to task for its failure to consider
Jones and for what he believed to be a return to the pre-Jones cases requiring a
possessory interest in the premises before standing would be allowed. He urged
that under Katz, standing should be granted "only to those who actually participated
in the conversation that has been illegally overheard." 394 U.S. at 189. Standing
would be denied to the owner, who did not participate in the relevant conversation
because, far from being a victim of the unlawful wiretap, Justice Harlan said that
the owner was seeking to intrude into the private lives of others by demanding to
know the contents of the third party's conversation. Id. at 193.
16.See Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 469-70 (1963) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
16 See Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 203 (1969) (Fortas, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part).
167 For an argument that such a search is so unreasonable as to be unconstitutional
at all times, see Spritzer, Electronic Surveillance By Leave of the Magistrate: The
Case in Opposition, 118 U. PA. L. Rev. 169 (1969).
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fining their investigation. Since it is practically impossible to anticipate
the exact contents of a bugged conversation,""8 electronic surveillance
cases are often "general searches" and the direction of the investigation
toward any one suspect becomes an inconsequential factor.0 9
With these basic characteristics of unlawful electronic surveillance
in mind, it would be desirable to grant standing to any person incrim-
inated by an illegal eavesdropping investigation.""0 Thus, electronic
surveillance searches would be treated like area searches which, as men-
tioned before,' 7' should be an exception to the general rule of standing.
This exception to the general proposals on the standing rule would have
two beneficial effects. By further removing the incentive to engage in
unlawful electronic surveillance, it will additionally deter a particularly
insidious fourth amendment violation. Moreover, it will insure a
greater freedom of communication. These gains are sufficient to out-
weigh the possible loss of relevant evidence which might result.
V. CONCLUSION
Rules of standing will continue to have an important function in
the law of search and seizure. The rules proposed in this Article repre-
sent a tentative effort to conserve the values of a rule of standing while
eliminating some serious shortcomings in the present law.
Given the premise that the sole purpose of the exclusionary rule
is to deter unlawful police conduct, the doctrine of standing can only
be justified as a vehicle for preventing the operation of the exclusionary
rule beyond the point of diminishing returns. Thus, the ideal rule of
standing will function to exclude evidence from criminal trials only
when the social value of the additional amount of deterrence gained out-
weighs the cost of excluding relevant evidence.
One is entitled to assume from its purpose that, at the very least,
the exclusionary rule would operate to provide substantial protection to
the ordinary citizen whose home or effects attract the attention of the
police. However, the present form of the rule of standing prevents the
exclusionary rule from deterring unlawful searches when, as in many
cases, the actual victim of the search is expected to be an innocent man.
Under the present rules, the police are not deterred from making an
168But see Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963).
169 For a discussion of the indiscriminate nature of all eavesdropping searches,
see The Supreme Court, 1960 Term, 75 HARv. L. REv. 40, 187 (1961).
17OSince eavesdropping evidence implicating nonconversants is hearsay to them,
the question whether nonconversants have standing will arise only in a "scope of taint"
situation, in which the overheard conversation provides the police with information
leading to the discovery of competent evidence. See, e.g., Wong Sun v. United States,
371 U.S. 471 (1963). See generally Pitler, atpra note 11.
171 Text accompanying note 112 mipra.
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unlawful search which will invade an innocent man's privacy. Neither
the innocent victim of the search nor the intended target have the
standing to object. Present standing rules do, however, deter the police
from making an unlawful search of papers of a man suspected of crim-
inal activity. To protect the "guilty" and not the "innocent" is
anomalous.
The proposed rule removes this anomaly and protects the innocent
to some degree by prohibiting the police from using evidence obtained
in these illegal searches. Admittedly, the approach suggested herein is
not an easy one to apply. Nevertheless, the difficulty in applying the
standard is outweighed by the detrimental effects of the alternatives.
Abolishing standing is a simpler answer, but the simplicity has a high
price tag-the exclusion of all evidence resulting from an illegal search,
regardless of the likelihood of deterrence. If this occurs, society loses
the opportunity to convict a suspect and gains nothing in the way of
better police conduct. If the focus is placed on the intent of the officer,
the deterrent purpose of exclusion is served without allowing applica-
tion of the rule to become a public nuisance.
[V9oi.119:333
